We show that investor recognition and bonding associated with cross-listing on a U.S. exchange are distinct effects using a sample of Canadian firms . In contrast to the post-listing decline documented in the literature, we find that cross-listed firms with a single class of shares enjoy a permanent increase in valuation if they attract and maintain investor recognition over time. Valuations of firms that fail to widen their U.S. shareholder base return to pre-listing levels within two years. Cross-listed firms with dual-class shares exhibit a permanent increase in valuation regardless of the level of U.S. investor holdings. This increase in valuation for dual-class firms with few or no U.S. investors suggests the reduction in information asymmetry between controlling and minority investors has a separate impact on valuation, consistent with firm-level bonding proposed by Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) .
Introduction
The literature on cross-listing documents a number of benefits to listing on a foreign stock exchange -benefits that are now seen as the conventional wisdom (Karolyi 2004) . Foreign firms that cross-list in the U.S. have higher valuations, a lower cost of capital, and increased liquidity.
The literature provides a number of explanations for the valuation premium. Two leading hypotheses are the investor recognition hypothesis of Merton (1987) and the bonding hypothesis of Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999) . We test these competing explanations in this paper. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver (2002) attribute part of the increase in a cross-listed firm's valuation to the broadening of its U.S. investor base and the greater visibility of the firm, as predicted by Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis.
Merton develops a capital asset pricing model under incomplete information where an increase in the number of investors aware of a firm lowers the expected returns on the firm's stock, resulting in a contemporaneous increase in valuation. This theory provides an incentive for foreign firms that are either neglected or have a low number of investors to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange if this action would increase their overall shareholder base. Indeed, surveys of managers confirm that one of the reasons behind their decision to cross-list is to broaden their shareholder base by attracting U.S. investors (Mittoo 1992; Fanto and Karmel 1997; and Bancel and Mittoo 2001) . Coffee (1999 Coffee ( , 2002 and Stulz (1999) suggest that a foreign firm from a jurisdiction featuring potentially weaker investor protection can increase its valuation by bonding itself to the U.S. securities regime through cross-listing. The bonding hypothesis suggests that companies with poor protection of minority shareholders signal their desire to respect the rights of shareholders by listing in a jurisdiction with higher scrutiny by reputational intermediaries, tougher regulation, and better enforcement. Better investor protection is seen as one of the factors that explain the increase in stock returns following cross-listing, as U.S. and home-country investors are more willing to invest in a foreign firm that has tied its hands in this way. Reese and Weisbach (2002) , Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) , and Doidge (2004) find empirical results that support the bonding hypothesis. Doidge (2004) tests this relationship using a sample of firms with dual-class shares from 20 countries that cross-list on a U.S. exchange. Dual-class shares are defined as two or more share classes with differential voting rights. 1 Doidge finds that while both share classes benefit from a U.S. listing, the minority share class benefits proportionately more as the voting premium between share classes narrows. The reduced premium, he argues, proxies for the greater protection offered to minority shareholders by a U.S. listing.
While the literature has reached a consensus on the impact of the two hypotheses , there are two issues that have not yet been resolved. First, Merton's theory predicts a permanent inc rease in valuation post-cross-listing assuming that investor recognition does not dissipate over time. The evidence in the literature, however, documents a pos t-listing decline in valuations within a year of cross-listing. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) show positive abnormal returns during the year prior to the actual listing followed by negative abnormal returns in the years following a U.S.
listing. Similarly, Mittoo (2003) finds that Canadian cross -listed firms outperform the market by 30-40% in the year prior to listing, but underperform the market by 13-30% over the three years subsequent to listing. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) provide further country-level evidence of this pattern in an event study of 764 firms from 35 countries that were cross-listed as of 1998. Gozzi, Levine and Schmukler (2005) document a similar pattern in a firm's Tobin's q ratio, although their study focuses on the changing components of Tobin's q and not changes in the shareholder base. Taken together, these empirical results do not support the prediction of permanent gains from Merton's model. One potential explanation for these findings is that these studies failed to control for changes in the level of investor recognition both cross-sectionally and over time. We explore this explanation in this paper.
Second, there is very little evidence on the links between the investor recognition hypothesis and the bonding hypothesis. Specifically, there is not enough evidence to determine whether the two effects can be distinguished from each other as both are related to an improvement in the information environment of a firm. Hence, the bonding effect may be indistinguishable or completely subsumed by the investor recognition effect and vice versa. Bris et al. (2005) try to disentangle the two effects using an event study of 21 dual-class firms that list one of their share classes in the U.S. They find that improved liquidity and access to foreign investors are the most 1 Following Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001), we use the term dual-class shares to refer to three categories of shares in Canada: non-voting shares, subordinate voting shares and restricted voting shares. Nenova (2003) reviews the literature on dual-class shares, and provides a rigorous analysis for measuring the private benefits of control.
important effects, while the effects of improved investor protection are economically small. In addition, Doidge et al. (2006) provide additional evidence by showing that foreign firms with concentrated ownership that cross-list on a U.S. exchange benefit more than widely-held firms in terms of increased valuations and analyst coverage. 2 Nonetheless, the evidence in Bris et al. (2005) is based on a very limited sample, while Doidge et al (2006) is a cross-sectional study that does not control for changing firm-level characteristics that may condition the longer-horizon effects. A large panel dataset covering a cross-section of cross-listed firms over time may provide a new perspective on these hypotheses and their relative importance.
Canadian firms provide unique opportunity to examine the long term effect of cross-listing on valuation and to disentangle the se two hypotheses. Canadian firms make up the single largest group of foreign firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges, providing a large sample with considerable time-series and cross-sectional variation in firm-level characteristics. In addition, the use of Canadian firms controls for country-level differences. Hence, the sample allows for both cross-sectional and time-series analysis of the impact of cross-listing on valuation.
In addition, Canada and the U.S. share the same legal, regulatory, and market institutions.
Canada is geographically close, shares the same time-zone, has the same English common-law legal system, and offers similar levels of shareholder protection as the United States.
Furthermore, a significant number of Canadian firms (close to 20%) have dual-class shares.
3 Dual-class shares allow the divergence of control and cash-flow rights, creating a more acute agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2006) show how this ownership structure creates lower valuations for U.S. firms, even though the level of investor protection in the U.S. is considered to be among the highest in the world.
Given the similarities between Canada and the U.S. we expect that bonding would have little if any impact on the valuation of Canadian firms with a single class of shares as these firms have no inherent conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. Further, we expect that any valuation premium would be attributed primarily to investor recognition. At the same time, the large sample of dual-class firms allows us to examine whether the valuation premium to cross-listed firms with dual-class shares is attributed to a bonding effect, an investor recognition effect, or both. Spe cifically, we can test for a firm-level bonding effect by examining whether the valuation premium of cross-listed dual-class firms with low investor recognition is positive and different from zero, after controlling for other firm characteristics. The impact of investor recognition can then be measured by examining the difference in valuation premium of crosslisted dual-class firms with high and low investor recognition.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we show cross-sectionally that the magnitude of the increase in valuation at the time of cross-listing is conditional on the widening of the firm's U.S. shareholder base. Firms that fail to attract U.S. investors do not experience an increase in valuation and are valued similarly to non-cross-listed firms. Second, we show that increased valuations associated with cross-listing are permanent only for firms that maintain a broader U.S. shareholder base as predicted by Merton's (1987) hypothesis. Third, we show that investor recognition and bonding are separate effects. Canadian firms that use dual-class shares to separate cash-flow from control rights are valued at a discount to widely-held firms, suggesting that the agency conflicts between minority and controlling shareholders are acute for these firms. Listing on a U.S. stock exchange mitigates this valuation discount allowing crosslisted firms with dual-class shares to trade at a premium relative to similar firms that are not cross-listed. In contrast to the findings for other firms, cross-listed firms with dual-class shares exhibit an increase in valuation that does not vary with the level of U.S. investor holdings.
Specifically dual-class firms with few or no U.S. investors experience a similar increase in valuation as dual-class firms with high investor recognition, and the increase in valuations is permanent, not transitory. This result suggests that increased monitoring and reduced information asymmetry between minority and controlling shareholders is the main effect explaining the increase in valuation for cross-listed dual-class firms, consistent with firm-level bonding proposed by Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) . 4 Overall, we show that cross-listed firms that widen their U.S. shareholder base trade at a permanent premium relative to non-cross-listed firms, and that the valuation premium of dual-class firms is attributed primarily to firm-level bonding effect whereas the valuation premium of single class firms is attributed primarily to investor recognition.
The remainder o f this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the competing investor recognition and firm-level bonding hypotheses, with reference to the literature on concentrated ownership and firm valuation. Section 3 describes the data and methodology, and presents descriptive statistics of our sample. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Hypothesis Development
The impact of cross-listing on a foreign stock exchange is a much-researched phenomenon (Karolyi 1998 (Karolyi , 2004 . While studies have generated a number of expla nations for the benefits of cross-listing, there is little consensus on what effect dominates. The evidence in the literature suggests three main drivers, among others: increased liquidity as the foreign firm's shares become more accessible to U.S. investors (the liquidity hypothesis), increased investor recognition associated with a widening of the cross-listed firm's shareholder base and an improvement in its information environment (the investor recognition hypothesi s), and reduced information asymmetry between controlling and minority shareholders due to greater monitoring and transparency (the firm-level bonding hypothesis). In this paper, we focus on the investor recognition and firm-level bonding hypotheses, as previous studies such as Mittoo (2003) rule out liquidity as an explanation of the longer-term performance. 5 This section develops these two hypotheses separately that we test jointly in section 4. Merton (1987) modifies the Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model to include a factor , the 'shadow cost of information', that proxies for incomplete information about the securities available for investment. The shadow cost of information is defined for stock i as 
Merton's (1987) Investor Recognition Hypothesis
where ) (
is the expected excess return of the stock for the complete information case when all investors are aware of the security ( 1 = i q ), and f R is the return on the riskless security. The implication is that as the firm's investor b ase increases, the shadow cost of incomplete information falls and observed returns should decline on average. In the setting of cross-listing, the implication is that foreign firms that are either neglected or have a low number of U.S.
investors will have an incentive to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange if this action will increase their overall shareholder base. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) This hypothesis implies a cross-sectional difference in valuation based on the holdings of U.S.
investors. Implicitly the increase in valuation is permanent. Although Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver (2002) examine the impact of investor recognition on stoc k returns around the cross-listing event, they do not examine the duration or longevity of the valuation effects associated with investor recognition beyond a one-year horizon.
Merton's theory is a general equilibrium relationship that predicts a permanent increase in valuation only if the actual level of investor holdings remains higher post-cross-listing, near the complete information case. Several studies provide evidence that suggests this effect may not be permanent. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) note that the cross-listed firms in their sample show positive abnormal returns during the year prior to the actual listing followed by negative abnormal returns in the years following a U.S. listing. Given the focus of their study is on the short-term effects, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) do not explain this longer-horizon pattern but suggest it may be due to changes in levels of investor recognition or liquidity. Mittoo (2003) 
Firm-level Bonding Hypothesis
The investor recognition hypothesis suggests that all firms stand to benefit from the increased visibility and broader investor base associated with cross -listing. The evidence suggests, however, that ownership structure may qualify this prediction. The literature on concentrated ownership focuses on two dimensions of ownership structure, the presence and control stake of a blockholder and the use of mechanisms that enhance control, such as dual-class shares. 8 Given the lack of reliable data on ownership stakes for the time period covered by this study, we focus on firms with dual-class shares, defined as a firm that has two or more classes of common shares with different voting rights. 9 By separating cash-flow rights from voting rights, dual-class share 7 Rather than testing the investor recognition hypothesis, Sarkissian and Schill (2004) focus on home bias and examine the impact on residual returns of country-level variables, such as the size of exports, industry structure, culture, and distance. They suggest that firms from countries that are relatively more familiar to foreign investors before the listing benefit most from the foreign listing. These authors do not measure investor recognition directly. The only firm-level characteristics in their model are firm size and a dummy variable classifying firms into tradable and non-tradable sectors. 8 Edison and Warnock (2004) , Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2005) , and Ferreira and Matos (2006) find that U.S. institutional investors avoid foreign firms that are controlled by a large blockholder. On the other hand, Ammer et al (2005) find that the improvement in the availability and quality of value-relevant information about a firm is a key for determining which firms attract U.S. investment. 9 Identifying controlling blockholders requires going over the annual filings and proxy statements of each firm. Discussions with Canadian regulators revealed that these proxy circulars are not available prior to 1997. For this reason, we focus on dual-class shares in this study. In a sensitivity analysis, we construct a matched sample covering a smaller number of firms and find that controlling for concentrated ownership does not affect any of the results. See Section 4.5.
structures allow controlling shareholders to escape the wealth consequences of their own decisions. 10 This separation weakens their alignment with minority shareholders and potentially increases the risk of expropriation. Thus , the incentives to indulge in wealth diversionary behavior or extract private benefits are higher in dual-class firms compared to firms with a one share-one vote structure (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985; Grossman and Hart 1988) .
The bonding hypothesis suggests a channel by which cross-listing can affect the valuation of firms with dual-class shares. While studies by Reese and Weisbach (2002) and Lang, Lins and Miller (2004) focus on country-level bonding due to increased legal protection of shareholders by the SEC, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) develop a firm-level theory of bonding that examines the incentives facing controlling shareholders. They model the cost-benefit tradeoff that controlling shareholders face when deciding whether to list on a U.S. stock exchange. By listing in the U.S., the firm increases the quality and quantity of information available to minority shareholders, and reduces the extent to which controlling shareholders can engage in expropriation. The decline in the private benefits of control is a cost borne by controlling shareholders. On the benefit side, listing on a U.S. exchange provides financially constrained firms with access to capital and increases the firm's ability to take advantage of growth opportunities. Controlling shareholders will have an incentive to cross -list if the benefits that accrue to them of exploiting valuable growth opportunities exceed the costs of greater monitoring and lower consumption of the private benefits of control following cross-listing. This firm-level bonding hypothesis is confirmed by Doidge et al (2006) who find that foreign firms with a large controlling shareholder are less likely to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange, but when they do they experience an increase in valuation and a greater increase in analyst coverage than the average cross-listed firm.
This firm-level bonding effect may be particularly important for firms where controlling shareholders use dual-class shares to separate cash-flow rights from control -rights. Doidge countries that cross-list on a U.S. exchange. He finds that while both share classes benefit from a U.S. listing, the minority share holders benefit proportionately more as the voting premium 10 Nenova (2003) provides a rigorous analysis for measuring the private benefits of control.
between share classes narrows. The reduced premium, he argues, proxies for the greater protection offered to minority shareholders by a U.S. listing. 11 Doidge et al (2006) note that firms with a separation of control and cash-flow rights have lower valuations on average, but experience a greater increase in valuation when they cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange than widely-held firms.
In general, investor recognition and firm-level bonding may be complementary effects as both are related to an improvement in the information environment of a firm. In both cases, crosslisting on a U.S. exchange reduc es the firm-specific risk premium charged by outside investors, lowers the cost of capital, and increases valuations. Whereas the investor recognition hypothesis focuses on the risk premium charged by investors who are not aware of the firm, firm-level bonding focuses on the risk premium demanded by existing investors who have incomplete information about the actions of controlling shareholders. Cross-listing increases the quantity of information about the foreign firm, reducing the shadow cost of incomplete information on one hand, and increases the quality of information reducing the information asymmetry between controlling and minority shareholders on the other. Given that a greater quantity of information for new investors may also lead to higher quality information for existing investors, the bonding effect may be indistinguishable or completely subsumed by the investor recognition effect. The key to distinguish between the two effects is to focus on a sample which consists of two groups of firms -Canadian firms with a single share class that have a similar alignment of shareholder interests as U.S firms, and Canadian firms with dual-class shares that have acute agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. Given that the first group faces the same principal-agent problems as U.S. firms, we expect the valuation premium of cross-listing to be primarily related to investor recognition. Conversely, the valuation premium to firms with agency conflicts is expected to be related both to investor recognition and firm-level bonding effects, but the latter effect will be most identifiable for firms that fail to widen their U.S.
shareholder base. In these cases, the effect of gr eater monitoring should dominate. Hence, our third hypothesis consists of three parts: 
Data
We study U.S. institutional ownership data are obtained from the 13-F regulatory filings reported on the CDA/Spectrum database. 12, 13 We identify cross-listed firms and the listing date using past issues of the TSX Review, tra ding data in CRSP, news searches on Factiva, and data from U.S. stock exchanges. Given that the focus of our study is on the cost and benefits of listing on a U.S.
exchange, we exclude firms that are traded over-the -counter on the OTC Bulletin Board or the NASD Pink Sheets.
The full sample consists of all Canadian firms that meet the following criteria: non-missing total assets (DATA6 on Compustat), sales (DATA12) , book value of equity (DATA60), and income before extraordinary items (DATA18). We exclude financial firms and small firms with a market capitalization less than C$10 million to make our sample comparable with other studies. Firms that delist due to a takeover, bankruptcy, or other reason are present in our sample until the year of delisting. These restrictions result in a final sample size of 7,070 firm-year observations (of which 1,890 are of cross-listed firms) from 1,265 firms (of which 287 are cross-listed).
12 The 13F data covers primarily companies that are listed on a U.S. exchange. Because there is no regulatory requirement for Canadian institutional investors to report their holdings or for U.S. institutional investors to report their foreign holdings, we do not have similar data for non-cross-listed Canadian firms . It is possible that U.S. institutions hold some of the firms in our sample that are not cross -listed or held shares in cross -listed companies before cross-listing, and hence our measure of investor recognition can be noisy. Nonetheless, we do not have data on institutional ownership prior to cross-listing, and therefore must rely on 13F. 13 In addition, cross-listed firms for which there was no information in CDA/Spectrum are treated as having no U.S. institutional investors.
Manufacturing and service firms make up 43% of the sample, followed by natural resource firms at 28%, high technology firms at 22%, and transportation and utility stocks at 7%.
We use Tobin's q as the valuation measure. 14 We compute Tobin's q as the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of debt scaled by total assets as of the end of the fiscal year for all firms in our sample. We use the following control variables in all regressions : firm size, future growth opportunities, leverage and profitability. Firm size is computed as the log of total assets.
We proxy future growth opportunities using past sales growth computed as the two-year average growth rate in sales. 15 Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets. Profitability is measured by the return on assets (ROA), calculated as earning before interest and taxes scaled by total assets. We winsorize these variables at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the impact of outliers.
[Insert Table 1 Figure 1 shows how the mean value for these variables increases each year following cross-listing, suggesting that cross-listing does widen the average foreign firm's U.S. investor base.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Results

Predicting the Decision to Cross-List and the Investment Decision of Institutional Investors
In this section we discuss the potential endogeneity among the valuation measure, the decision to cross-list, and the investment decision of institutional investors. We use a three-stage least squares approach, where we estimate the probability of cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange, predict the level of holdings of U.S. investors based on firm characteristics, and use these predicted values in regressions on Tobin's q.
Predicting the Decision to Cross-list
A significant methodological issue facing cross-listing studies is the possible endogeneity between valuation and the decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange. While theory may suggest the direction of causation runs from cross-listing to higher firm valuations, an alternative explanation is that firms with higher valuations list on a U.S. stock exchange following a period of strong performance. A failure to deal with endogeneity may lead the estimated coefficients on the cross-listing variable to be biased, generating misleading results. To address the issue of endogeneity, we follow Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) and estimate a treatment-effects model for the decision to cross-list, where a firm is coded 1 if cross-listed and zero otherwise. 17 The first-stage equation is estimated as a probit, where the output is the predicted probability of being cross-listed in a given year. We then use the predicted probability of cross-listing in subsequent regressions to measure the impact of cross-listing on a firm's valuation.
Following the literature we use the following variables to estimate the probability of crosslisting: firm size, foreign sales, sales growth, ownership structure, industry membership, profitability, and leverage. Pagano, Röell and Zechner (2002) find that the proportion of foreign sales and the size of the company are the two most important variables explaining the decision to list abroad among European firms. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) document that firms with growth opportunities are more likely to list abroad, with U.S. investors assigning the highest value to growth opportunities. Mittoo (2003) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004) suggest that industry membership is an important characteristic affecting the decision to cross-list. We therefore include industry dummies identifying firms in four broad categories: high-tech industries, natural resources, utilities and transportation, and manufacturing and service industries. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) also predict that ownership structure affects the decisio n to cross-list. Controlling shareholders have an incentive to cross -list if the benefits that accrue to them of exploiting valuable growth opportunities exceed the costs of greater monitoring and 17 An alternative approach is to use matching methods, whereby observations of cross-listed firms for a given year are matched with non-cross-listed firms based on observable characteristics such as firm size and industry membership. We discuss this approach in the section on Sensitivity Analyses.
lower consumption of the private benefits of control following cross-listing. These monitoring costs will be highest for blockholders that use dual-class shares to maintain control, as the private benefits of control are higher. We identify these firms using a dummy variable, DUALCLASS, coded 1 if the firm has dua l-class shares and zero otherwise. Because the size of unexploited growth opportunities must be large enough to offset the higher costs of monitoring, we also construct a dummy variable, HIGROW, that takes a value of 1 for firms with higher than the median sales growth, and zero otherwise. We interact HIGROW with DUALCLASS to identify those dual-class firms that have the greatest incentive to cross-list.
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results of the probit model of the decision to cross-list. The pseudo-R squared is close to 40%, and a chi-squared test confirms the statistical significance of the overall specification. Consistent with prior research, larger firms and firms with high foreign sales are more likely to cross-list. We find a negative relationship between cross-listing and leverage and ROA. The coefficient on sales growth and HIGROW are positive but not statistically significant, t he coefficient on DUALCLASS is negative but not significant.
However, the interaction of DUALCLASS with HIGROW is positive, implying that firms where the benefits of exploiting growth opportunities appear large are more likely to bear the costs of greater monitoring following a U.S. listing. This finding is consistent with the predictions of Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) .
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[Insert Table 2 here]
Endogeneity in the Investment Decision of U.S. Institutional Investors
Our main variable of interest is the change in investor recognition, which we proxy by the size of the U.S. investor base following cross-listing. The relationship between investor recognition and the valuation of cross-listed firms may also suffer from an endogeneity problem. Bushee (1998), Ammer et al (2004) , and Ferreira and Matos (2006) We predict the holdings of U.S. investors based on firm-level characteristics. Edison and Warnock (2004) , Ammer et al (2004) , Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2005) , and Ferreira and Matos (2006) find that U.S. investors hold more stock in foreign firms with the following characteristics: large size, liquid trading, higher profitability, higher growth opportunities, lower financial leverage, higher visibility through membership in a major stock index, and lower dividend payout. 19 We therefore include controls for firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, and leverage as before. We proxy for liquidity using share turnover, measured as total shares traded in a given year divided by shares outstanding. To control for visibility, we use a dummy variable to identify Canadian firms whose shares are included in the Toronto Stock
Exchange 300 composite index (TSE300) for a given year. 20 We measure dividend payout as dividends paid to common shareholders divided by book value of common equity. Edison and Warnock (2004) , Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2005) , Ammer et al (2004) , and Ferreira and Matos (2006) find that U.S. institutional investors avoid foreign firms controlled by a large blockholder, particularly where owners use dual-class shares to separate cash-flow rights from control rights.
We therefore control for ownership structure by including the DUALCLASS dummy. Finally, we include factors identified by Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) , Dahlquist and Robertsson (2002) , and Bushee (1998) that explain the domestic holdings of U.S. institutional investors: a LOSS dummy set equal to 1 if the firm reports negative earnings and zero o therwise; and research and development (R&D) intensity, measured as R&D expense divided by total sales.
19 These studies identify country-level characteristics affecting U.S. holdings of foreign stocks that are controlled for in our study, namely: close geographical proximity, high number of U.S. listings, credible accounting information, high disclosure requirements, and low transaction costs on the home exchange. 20 The TSE300 index identifies the largest Canadian firms by market capitalization in a given year. The TSE300 index was replaced by the S&P/TSX composite index in May 2002, at which time the number of firms was reduced to remove smaller, more illiquid firms. Table 3 examines the cross-sectional impact of investor recognition on Tobin's q, estimated using panel regressions with firm random effects. 21 The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm. Column (1) of Table 3 presents the base regression of the effect of crosslisting on Tobin's q. Consistent with the extant literature, Tobin's q is positive ly related to sales growth and negatively related to size and leverage. The coefficient on ROA is not significant.
Panel B of
Cross-Sectional Impact of Investor Recognition on Tobin's q
The coefficient on DUALCLASS is negative and significant, indicating that firms with dualclass shares are valued at a discount relative to firms with a one share-one vote structure. This result confirms the findings of other studies that document a negative relationship between firm value and the separation of cash-flow rights from control rights (Claessens et al 2002; Lins 2003; Lemmon and Lins 2003; Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003) . The coefficient on the predicted 21 The regressions throughout the paper are estimated using panel data, firm random-effects, because a number of our variables of interest are either time-invariant -such as our industry dummies -or exhibit few changes over time -such as the dummy for firms with dual-class shares. A fixed-effects regression would drop these time invariant dummies, as their effect could not be distinguished from the firm-specific error term that is also time invariant.
probability of cross-listing (XLIST) is positive (0. 200) and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that cross-listed firms enjoy a higher valuation than non-cross-listed firms on average . This finding is consistent with the ubiquitous evidence in the cross-listing literature (Karolyi 1998 (Karolyi , 2004 .
[Insert Table 3 here]
Column (2) of Table 3 Overall, the findings in Table 3 suggest that the increase in valuation associated with crosslisting may be explained by the two competing hypotheses -the investor recognition hypothesis and the firm-level bonding hypothesis. Cross-listed firms with a one share -one vote structure exhibit higher valuations relative to non-cross-listed firms, and the valuation premium is increasing in the degree of investor recognition. Further, it appears that the entire valuation premium from cross-listing is explained by investor recognition and firm characteristics. Firms with dual-class shares, however, get a valuation premium following cross-listing regardless of the increase in investor recognition. This finding is consistent with a firm-level bonding effect due to an improvement in the firm's infor mation environment. Taken together, the results are consistent with both the investor recognition hypothesis and the firm-level bonding hypothesis.
The firm-level bonding hypothesis is expected to affect those firms with agency problems (i.e.
dual-class firms) only, whereas the investor recognition hypothesis is expected to dominate for firms without agency problems (i.e. single-class firms). Furthermore, when there is a potential impact of both firm-level bonding and investor recognition (i.e. dual-class firms) we find that the firm-level bonding effect dominates; in fact, the valuation premium from cross-listing does not vary significantly with the degree of investor recognition.
Times-Series Impact of Investor Recognition on Tobin's q
The regressions in Table 3 show that the cross-sectional valuation premium of cross-listing depends in part on investor recognition. These regressions , however, do not address whether the effects of cross-listing on a firm's valuation are permanent or temporary. In this s ection we examine the valuation premium over time and its relation to investor recognition.
To motivate this analysis, Figure 2 shows the evolution of the mean and median Tobin's q ratio over the five years before and after cross-listing for 148 Canadian firms that first cross-listed on a U.S. exchange between 1988 and 2005. Both the mean and median valuation peak in the year prior to cross-listing (XLIST year = -1), then decline monotonically in subsequent years. While an announcement effect of cross-listing may explain part of the run-up close to the event, the out -performance appears to begin several years prior to cross-listing, suggesting that firms decide to cross-list following a period of strong performance. This pre-listing run-up and postlisting decline is consistent with the findings in Foerster and Karolyi (1999) , Mittoo (2003) , and Sarkissian and Schill (2004) who show a similar pattern using abnormal returns, and Gozzi, Levine and Schmukler (2005) who show this pattern using Tobin's q. 22 This p icture also suggests that the increase in valuation associated with cross-listing is time-varying, and motivates an analysis of the persistence of the effects.
[Insert Figure 2 here] Table 4 presents regressions quantifying the valuation premium over time. Column (1) shows the regression results of Tobin's q on the control variables and a dummy variable for each year relative to the year of cross-listing. 23 For example, CYR 0 is the actual year of cross-listing, CYR 1 is the first year following cross-listing, and so on. 24 The regression includes the CYR dummies from 2 years before cross-listing and on. Thus, the valuation in year three prior to cross-listing or earlier is captured by the intercept. The control variables have the same sign, magnitude, and statistical significance as in Table 3 . The coefficients on the CYR dummies are positive and significant, suggesting a pre-listing run-up that starts at CYR -2 (0.310), peaks in CYR -1 (0.722) and then declines post-cross-listing. The positive and significant coefficients on CYR 1 through CYR 3 imply a higher valuation on average relative to three or more years prior to crosslisting. 25 The coefficient on CYR 3 (0.305) implies that there is a permanent gain in valuation of 9.4% for cross-listed firms relative to their valuations three years prior to cross-listing. This conclusion is reinforced by the observations that CYR 3 (which includes the third year and on post cross-listing) identifies the average effect for almost three-quarters of the observations of cross-listed firms in our sample. We note that the XLIST variable identifying the predicted 22 The results in Foerster and Karolyi (1999) correspond to the interval [-1,1] in Figure 2 , Mittoo (2003) to [-1,3] , Gozzi, Levine and Schmukler (2005) to [-2,2]. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) examine the window [-10, 10] . 23 We code these dummy variables based on the actual year of cross-listing, as the predicted values of XLIST only provide a probability of being listed in a given year and cannot be used to generate these dummies. 24 To conserve space, we group years 3 and higher under one dummy variable (CYR 3+). Years -3 and earlier are the reference case in these regressions. 25 Note that the overall premium in each year post cross-listing is computed as the sum of the CYR dummy and XLIST. The sums of the CYR dummies and XLIST are all positive and significant.
probability of cross-listing is not significant as the explanatory power is picked up by the CYR dummies. While the interaction with dual-class (XDC) is not significant, the linear combination of DUALCLASS, XLIST, and XDC is not significantly different from zero, confirming the valuation premium to cross-listed firms with dual-class shares. The sum of DUALCLASS, XLIST and XDC is not significantly different from zero throughout the following regressions.
[Insert Table 4 here]
In column (2) of Table 4 , we examine how increased investor recognition affects this pattern over time. We include the predicted number of U.S. investors, INS_NUM, and find that it is positive and significant (0.224), confirming the results in Table 3 . Interestingly, the CYR dummies change signs, and are negative and significant in CYR 0, CYR 2 and CYR 3+. These negative coefficients must be interpreted carefully, as they imply that firms that do not widen 
26
This premium is similar in magnitude to the premium reported in Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) .
In column (3) of Table 4 shared evenly by all cross-listed firms. Firms that have more than the median predicted number of U.S. investors have positive and significant valuation premium in each year post-cross-listing, whereas cross-listed firms that fail to attract higher than the median predicted number of U.S.
investors do not trade at a premium.
Column (4) replicates the analysis in Column (3) using only the sample of dual-class firms. The XLIST variable is positive and significant (0.676), implying that Tobin's q ratios of cross-listed dual-class firms are 20.1% higher on average without taking into account the increase in the U.S.
investor base. The pre-listing run-up for dual-class firms is also positive and significant. Unlike the case in column (3), however, all of the coefficients on the predicted value of INS_NUM in the years after cross-listing are not significant, implying that there is no systematic variation in valuations for dual-class firms based on levels of investor recognition. This finding confirms the results in Table 3 that firms with dual-class shares get a valuation premium following crosslisting regardless of their increase in investor recognition. Thus, the results imply that t he impact of reduced information asymmetry between controlling and minority shareholders following cross-listing is the main effect increasing valuations. Finally, Column (5) Overall, the results suggest that the permanent effect of cross-listing on a firm's valuation is conditional on firm characteristics, investor recognition, and ownership structure. First, firms with a one share-one vote structure appear to cross-list on U.S. exchanges following a pre-listing run-up in their Tobin's q ratios. Second, consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis, only the firms that succeed in widening their U.S. investor base significantly get a permanent increase in their valuations relative to the non-cross-listed firms. Canadian firms that attract few or no U.S. investors experience a post -listing decline in Tobin's q and do not exhibit higher valuations relative to non-cross-listed companies. Third, the impact of cross-listing on firms with dual-class shares is different. These firms begin with lower valuations, consistent with investors charging a higher risk premium to offset the greater risk of expropriation by controlling shareholders. The decision to cross-list leads to a significant increase in valuation and this premium does not vary with the level of investor recognition. Further, the increase in valuation appears to be permanent.
This finding is consistent with a firm-level bonding effect due to an improvement in the firm's information environment.
Robustness Using Only Firms That Cross-list between 1988 and 2005
The analysis thus far has addressed endogeneity in both the decision to cross-list and the foreign holdings of U.S. investors by predicting these variables and including them in the main regressions. In this section, we check the robustness of our results in Tables 3 and 4 by constructing our sample differently. Rather than comparing cross-listed firms with non-crosslisted firms, we take advantage of our sample and compare the cross-listed firms against their own history by looking at their valuation before and after cross-listing.
We identify all firms in our sample that cross-listed for the first time between 1988 and 2005.
Firms that were cross-listed prior to 1988 are not included as we do not observe their valuation prior to cross-listing. We exclude firms that cross-list at the time of an initial public offering or firms that cross-list following a spin-off for the same reason. These restrictions reduce our sample to 1,352 observations for 206 firms , where the median firm is in the sample for 6 years. Table 5 repeats the main results from Tables 3 and 4 , but with two key differences. First, instead of using the predicted probability of cross-listing from Table 2 , we use a dummy variable (XLIST) set to one if the firm is actually cross-listed and zero otherwise. Second, we use the log of actual number of U.S. investors holding the stock as opposed to the predicted values. 27 We confirm that the results below are robust when using the predicted values of the number of investors instead of the actual values.
Column (1) Tobin's q ratio that is 8% higher on average post cross-listing.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Column (2) 
Sensitivity Analyses
We examine the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we replicate all the regressions using the predicted value of percentage holdings of U.S. institutional investors in Tables 3 and 4, and the actual values in Table 5 . The results are very similar to those reported. Second, we examine whether our results are robust to the way we control for endogeneity in the decision to cross-list by using a matched sample. Specifically, the sample is constructed using one-to-one matching (without replacement) of cross-listed firms with non-cross-listed firms based on year, firm size measured by total assets, and industry membership using the first two-digits of the North-American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. The results are similar with one important exception; the impact of investor recognition on the valuation premium wears off after two years, controlling for firm characteristics. There are two possible explanations for the divergence in the results: (1) the matched sample is much smaller -2,802 firm-year observations as opposed to 7,070 -providing less power to these tests, particularly as the number of observations post -cross-listing declines; (2) the matching process does not control for other important variables that are related to the decision to cross-list such as foreign sales, growth opportunities and ownership structure. Third, we examine whether the results change in the matched sample analysis when we control for the presence of a controlling shareholder at the 20% threshold and a single class of shares. We find that controlling for concentrated ownership does not affect any of the results.
Conclusion
This study examines the cross-sectional and time-varying impact o f investor recognition and firm-level bonding on the valuation of Canadian firms cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. Canada provides a unique setting to disentangle these competing hypotheses, as it features similar levels of investor protection and disclosure as the United States, but offers a larger cross-section of dual-class firms -both cross-listed on a U.S. exchange and listed exclusively in the home market -where the incentives of controlling and minority shareholders diverge. We examine the change in Tobin's q ratios of 287 cross-listed firms relative to 978 non-cross-listed firms over a 16-year period from 1988 to 2005. We show that increased valuations associated with greater investor recognition following a U.S. listing are conditional on the widening of the U.S. shareholder base.
Consistent with the findings in Foerster and Karolyi (1999) Using panel regressions, we examine the impact of cross-listing on a firm's valuation over time.
In contrast to the earlier studies, we find that the effects of greater investor recognition are permanent for a large subset of firms , not transitory. Canadian firms that attract the highest number or proportional holdings of U.S. institutional investors experience a permanent increase in valuation. Canadian firms that fail to sustain a wider U.S. investor base experience a postlisting decline, with valuations that return to levels below their pre-listing levels within two years of cross-listing. This result is robust when we examine the valuations of cross-listed firms before and after their U.S. listing.
We also provide evidence that an increase in a firm's shareholder base and an improvement in its information environment are distinct but related effects. We disentangle these effects by focus ing on the impact of cross-listing across firms that use dual-class shares to separate cash-flow from control rights. Prior research of U.S. firms by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2006) and foreign firms by Claessens et al (2002) , Lins (2003) , Lemmon and Lins (2003) and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) confirms that the separation of cash from control rights leads to lower valuations due to the increased risk of expropriation of minority shareholders. We find that Canadian firms wit h dual-class shares benefit relatively more from cross-listing. We also show that this premium from cross-listing does not depend on whether these firms succeed or not in expanding their U.S.
shareholder base. In particular, dual-class firms that attract few or no U.S. investors exhibit higher valuations post-cross-listing, consistent with the firm-level bonding effect proposed by Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) . This result is consistent with a U.S. listing improving a firm's information environment and reducing the information asymmetry between controlling and minority shareholders for firms where the agency conflicts are most acute. This table reports results of a probit that estimates the probability of cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange over the period 1988 to 2005. The sample is cross-listed and non-cross -listed Canadian firms. Log of assets is total assets in millions converted to U.S. dollars using the fiscal year-end exchange rate. Foreign sales is the percentage of total sales outside of Canada. Sales growth is the two-year average growth rate in sales. If two-year data is not available, one year growth in sales is used. HIGROW is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for firms with past sales growth that is above the median for the sample, and 0 otherwise. Leverage is total debt / total assets. ROA is earning before interest and taxes / total assets. Dual-class is a dummy equal to 1 for firms with two or more share classes with different voting rights. Industry dummies are included but not shown. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels . Tables 1 and 2 . Industry and year dummies are included but not shown. The regressions are estimated using panel data with firm random effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. (1) to (3), and dual-class firms only in column (4) and (5). CYR -2 to CYR +3 are dummy variables based on the year relative to cross-listing, where CYR 0 is the year of listing on a U.S. stock exchange. CYR 3+ takes the value of 1 if the year post cross -listing is 3 and on . The variables INS_NUM in CYR i (i=0,1,2,3) are coded as the predicted value of INS_NUM in CYR i post cross-listing and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 3 . Industry and year dummies are included but not shown. The regressions are estimated using panel data with firm random effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels . Mean and Median Tobin's q
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